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2026 INSC 443Supreme Court of India

Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy

Death of the Doctor: Does a Medical Negligence Claim Die With Him?

4 May 2026Justice J.K. Maheshwari, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
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TL;DR

The Supreme Court resolved a long-neglected question: when a doctor accused of medical negligence dies while the consumer case is still pending, can his legal heirs be made to answer the claim? The Court held that the common law maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" (a personal action dies with the person) has been statutorily modified in India by Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, read with Order XXII of the CPC. Purely personal claims (like damages for pain and suffering due to personal injury) abate on the doctor's death, but claims that represent a loss to the estate or accretion to the deceased's estate survive against his legal heirs. The legal heirs of Dr. P.B. Lall were rightly impleaded, and the matter was remitted to the NCDRC to first decide negligence and then determine which surviving claims are recoverable from the estate.

The Bottom Line

A medical negligence claim does not automatically die when the doctor dies. The Supreme Court clarified that personal-injury claims (compensation for the patient's own suffering) lapse with the doctor's death, but claims representing quantifiable pecuniary loss to the estate survive and can be recovered from the doctor's heirs to the extent of the inherited estate. The heirs of a deceased negligent doctor can be brought on record, but only to answer claims chargeable to the estate — not personal claims that perished with the doctor.

Case Timeline

The journey from FIR to Supreme Court verdict

event
11 Feb 1990

Eye Surgery by Dr. P.B. Lall

Dr. Lall performed surgery on the complainant's wife's right eye after she complained of severe pain. The pain recurred on 16 March 1990, and despite treatment there was no relief.

filing
13 Aug 1997

Consumer Complaint Filed

Nearly seven and a half years after the alleged negligence, the complainant filed a consumer complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the District Forum, Munger, seeking compensation of Rs. 4,50,000.

order
5 Nov 2003

District Forum Holds Doctor Negligent

The District Forum partly allowed the complaint, holding Dr. Lall negligent for deficiency in service and awarding total compensation of Rs. 2,60,000.

order
2 Dec 2005

SCDRC Sets Aside the Award

The State Commission, Patna, allowed Dr. Lall's appeal, holding the loss of vision was due to glaucoma and that no expert evidence of negligence had been produced. The District Forum's award was set aside.

event
4 Aug 2009

Death of Dr. P.B. Lall

While the complainant's revision petition was pending before the NCDRC, Dr. Lall passed away, raising the question of whether the proceedings survived against his legal heirs.

order
26 May 2010

NCDRC Allows Substitution (Impugned Order I)

The NCDRC allowed the complainant's application to substitute Dr. Lall's legal heirs (his wife and son) and directed them to be brought on record.

order
24 May 2018

NCDRC Dismisses Heirs' Objections (Impugned Order II)

The NCDRC dismissed the legal heirs' applications seeking to drop their names, observing they would be liable to satisfy any decree to the extent payable from the estate, and posted the matter for final hearing.

judgment
4 May 2026

Supreme Court Delivers Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld the impleadment of the legal heirs in principle, clarified that estate claims survive while personal-injury claims abate, set aside the impugned orders, and remitted the matter to the NCDRC for adjudication within six months.

The Story

In February 1990, a patient consulted Dr. P.B. Lall, a highly qualified eye specialist (MBBS, M.S. Eye, M.S. ENT, DO London), at his private clinic in Munger, Bihar, complaining of severe pain in her right eye. Dr. Lall advised immediate surgery, which was performed on 11 February 1990. The pain, however, recurred on 16 March 1990, and despite further treatment there was no relief. The complainant (the patient's husband) took his wife to doctors in Bhagalpur and Aligarh, and ultimately consulted Dr. B. Sridhar at Shankar Netralaya, Madras. There, as alleged, he was informed that his wife had already lost vision in her right eye due to wrong treatment and operation, which could further affect the left eye. Her left eye was operated on 5 May 1994, and treatment continued until 1997.

On 13 August 1997 — nearly seven and a half years after the alleged negligence — the complainant filed a consumer complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the District Forum, Munger, alleging deficiency in service and seeking compensation of Rs. 4,50,000. The District Forum, by order dated 5 November 2003, partly allowed the complaint, holding Dr. Lall negligent and awarding Rs. 2,60,000.

On cross-appeals, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC), Patna, by common order dated 2 December 2005, allowed Dr. Lall's appeal and set aside the District Forum's award. The SCDRC held that the loss of vision was due to glaucoma — not curable even after surgery — that the surgery was performed with the best of abilities and was acceptable under medical ethics, and that the complainant had produced no expert evidence to substantiate negligence.

The complainant then filed Revision Petition No. 432 of 2006 before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). While the revision was pending, Dr. Lall passed away on 4 August 2009. The complainant moved an application to substitute Dr. Lall's legal heirs (his wife Kumud Lall and his son Amit Kumar), which the NCDRC allowed on 26 May 2010 (Impugned Order I). The legal heirs resisted, contending that since Dr. Lall had succeeded before the SCDRC, no subsisting decree existed against him on the date of his death and the proceedings ought to have abated. The original complainant also died on 16 January 2014 and her legal heirs were substituted. The NCDRC dismissed the heirs' applications by order dated 24 May 2018 (Impugned Order II), observing that the legal heirs would be liable to satisfy the decretal amount to the extent payable from the estate left behind.

Aggrieved, the legal heirs of Dr. Lall approached the Supreme Court. Given the importance and unsettled nature of the issue, the Court appointed Mr. Raghenth Basant, Senior Advocate, as amicus curiae, and the Indian Medical Association (Kerala State Branch) appeared as intervenor.

Legal Issues

Click each question to reveal the Supreme Court's answer

1Question

Whether, upon the death of a doctor during the pendency of consumer proceedings at the appellate or revisional stage, the legal heirs can be impleaded and held liable for the alleged act of medical negligence of the deceased doctor — and if so, to what extent?

Tap to reveal answer
1SC Answer

Partly yes. The legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record, but their liability is confined to claims that survive against the estate of the deceased. The extent of liability depends on the pleadings and evidence and on whether a particular claim represents a personal cause of action (which abates) or a loss to / accretion of the estate (which survives).

Settles a question the Court itself described as having been "lost to the pages of history" — directly governing how medical negligence and other tort claims proceed when the alleged wrongdoer dies mid-litigation.

2Question

Whether the common law maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" (a personal action dies with the person) applies with full rigour in India to extinguish a medical negligence claim on the death of the doctor?

Tap to reveal answer
2SC Answer

No. The Court held that the maxim has been statutorily modified in India by the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, the Legal Representatives' Suits Act 1855, and Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The maxim survives only to the extent of the carved-out exceptions — purely personal causes of action such as defamation, assault and personal injuries not causing death.

Prevents the mechanical application of an antiquated maxim that would otherwise allow estates to escape liability merely because the wrongdoer died, while preserving the survival of pecuniary estate claims.

3Question

Whether the "right to sue / cause of action" referred to in Order XXII Rules 2 and 4 of the CPC is a matter of procedure or of substantive law, and where is it located?

Tap to reveal answer
3SC Answer

It is a matter of substantive law, located in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Order XXII of the CPC is purely procedural and must be harmoniously construed with Section 306, which determines whether the right to sue survives on death.

Clarifies that survivability is not decided by procedural provisions alone — courts must first ask, under substantive law, whether the cause of action survives before applying the procedure for substitution.

Arguments

The battle of arguments before the Supreme Court

Petitioner

Vihaan Kumar

1

No subsisting decree existed against the doctor on the date of his death, so the proceedings abated

Ms. Sarvshree, counsel for the appellants (Dr. Lall's legal heirs), argued that the complaint had been dismissed by the SCDRC and during the pendency of the revision Dr. Lall passed away. Therefore, on the date of his death no formal decree existed against him, the proceedings ought to have closed as abated, and no right to sue survived against the legal representatives.

Order XXII Rule 4 CPCSection 306 Indian Succession Act, 1925
2

The maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" extinguishes the claim on the doctor's death

It was urged that medical negligence is a personal tort, and in view of Section 306 of the 1925 Act — which excepts personal injuries not causing death from survival — no proceedings can continue against the legal heirs of the doctor for his alleged negligence.

Section 306 Indian Succession Act, 1925G. Jayaprakash v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 (AP) 20
3

No loss to the estate is claimed and there is no enrichment of the estate

The appellants contended that no loss to the estate was alleged and the estate of Dr. Lall was not enriched by any wrong, so the legal heirs could not be substituted. In the absence of a decree, recording a finding of personal injury due to medical negligence could not be pursued against the legal representatives.

Section 306 Indian Succession Act, 1925
4

Legal heirs of a doctor who rendered service in person cannot be substituted for individual negligence

Reliance was placed on a line of precedents to argue that the 1986 Act does not define "opposite party" and that in case of death of a service provider who rendered service in person, his legal heirs cannot be substituted for the doctor's individual negligent act.

Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556Balbir Singh Makol v. Chairman, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, 2001 (1) CPR 45 (NC)

Respondent

State of Haryana

1

Order XXII of the CPC applies and the legal heirs must be substituted where the right to sue survives

Mr. Umesh Sinha, counsel for the respondents (the complainant's heirs), argued that the provisions of the CPC apply to the 1986 Act and that under Order XXII Rule 4, even where a sole defendant dies, his legal heirs ought to be substituted when the right to sue survives. The legal heirs inherited Dr. Lall's estate and any liability fixed for negligence could be recovered from that estate.

Section 13(7) Consumer Protection Act, 1986Order XXII Rule 4 CPCSection 2(11) CPC
2

The maxim is "unworkable" in modern social jurisprudence and has been recommended for abolition

It was submitted that the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" had been described as "unworkable" by the 178th Report of the Law Commission of India and the 8th Report of the Haryana Law Commission, both of which recommended amendment. At this stage, only a pecuniary claim survived, which could be satisfied from the estate of the opposite party.

178th Report of the Law Commission of India8th Report of the Haryana Law Commission
3

A conscious legislative choice not to define "opposite party" shows an intent to allow survival against the estate

The intervenor, Indian Medical Association (Kerala State Branch), through Senior Advocate Shyam Padman, submitted that the 1986 Act does not define "opposite party," indicating a conscious legislative intent to allow a claim to survive against the estate of the opposite party after death, with the procedure provided in Section 13(7) read with Order XXII of the CPC.

Section 13(7) Consumer Protection Act, 1986Section 38(12) Consumer Protection Act, 2019
4

Loss to the estate is a distinct, surviving head of claim representing compensatory civil liability

It was urged by the amicus that even on a strict reading of Section 306, claims for loss to the estate — medical expenses incurred, loss of income during the consumer's lifetime, and other pecuniary loss — represent quantifiable economic loss, are a distinct head of compensatory civil liability rather than a personal cause of action, and therefore survive and are transmissible to the legal representatives.

Section 306 Indian Succession Act, 1925M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556

Court's Analysis

How the Court reasoned its decision

The Court undertook an exhaustive survey of the legal history of the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona," tracing it from 15th-century English common law through Hambly v. Trott, Phillips v. Homfray, the English statutory reforms (the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 / Lord Campbell's Act and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1935), and into Indian law via the Indian Fatal Accidents Act 1855, the Legal Representatives' Suits Act 1855, and Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The Court emphasised that the maxim has been statutorily modified in India: the general rule is that all rights and liabilities to maintain a suit succeed the death of a person and pass to his successors, subject only to carved-out exceptions — defamation, assault, personal injuries not causing death, and cases where the relief would be nugatory. Reading these exceptions strictly (so that they do not "chew" the enabling provision), the Court held that the exception relating to personal injury bars only personal causes of action and not claims against the property or estate of the deceased. The Court located the "right to sue" of Order XXII Rules 2 and 4 in substantive law under Section 306, harmonising the procedural CPC with the substantive Succession Act, and drawing on the proprietary-versus-personal rights distinction from Salmond and from Vinayak Purshottam Dube v. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat. Applying this, the Court disapproved the NCDRC's Balbir Singh Makol ratio for mechanically applying the maxim and for extending the bar to estate claims, and narrowly confined the ratio in Melepurath Sankunni and Evelyn Sequeira to purely personal defamation claims. The Court concluded that the doctor's legal heirs could be impleaded, but only estate-chargeable claims survive; the NCDRC must first adjudicate negligence and then determine which surviving claims are recoverable from the estate.

The common law maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" in India has been statutorily modified by various statutory instruments such as Fatal Accidents' Act of 1855, Legal representatives' Suits Act of 1855, Indian Succession Act of 1925, etc.

Para 64(i)

The cornerstone holding — the antiquated maxim does not apply with full rigour in India because the legislature has expressly modified it, so survival of claims must be tested against the statutes, not the bare maxim.

Generally, all rights and liabilities to maintain a suit are carried to the legal representative under Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. However, when adjudicating claims under 1st exception to Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, personal injury claims abate, while claims for or against the estate of the deceased survive.

Para 64(vi)

States the operative dividing line of the judgment: personal-injury claims die with the person, but estate claims survive against the heirs — the test that lower forums must now apply.

The scope of exception cannot be allowed to chew the enabling provision which sets the tone for liabilities to be carried by legal representatives for a deceased person.

Para 55

Articulates the interpretive method — exceptions to survival under Section 306 must be construed strictly so they do not swallow the general rule that liabilities pass to the legal representative.

The "right to sue/cause of action" mentioned under Order XXII Rule 2 and 4 have to be located under substantive law to be found in Section 306 of 1925 Act. The extent of survival of right/cause depends on the facts and remedy sought in the suit.

Para 56

Clarifies that survivability is governed by substantive law, not by procedural Order XXII alone, and that the nature of the claim and relief determines whether the cause of action survives.

Upon the death of the alleged medically negligent doctor, his/her legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record. Consequently, the extent of liability will be determined based on the pleadings and evidence presented.

Para 67

The direct answer to the framed question — impleadment of heirs is permissible, with the extent of liability left to be worked out on the pleadings and evidence before the NCDRC.

Partly Allowed

The Verdict

Relief Granted

The appeals filed by the legal heirs of Dr. P.B. Lall were disposed of. While the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the proceedings stood wholly abated on the doctor's death, it also rejected the NCDRC's view that any adjudication on merits would be recoverable from the estate. The Court held that personal-injury claims abate while estate-chargeable claims survive, set aside both impugned orders, restored the revision petition, and directed the NCDRC to first decide negligence and then determine the recoverable surviving claims within six months.

Directions Issued

  • The legal heirs of the deceased doctor can be impleaded and brought on record, but their liability is confined to claims that survive against the estate under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
  • The NCDRC must first adjudicate the question of negligence of the deceased doctor and then determine which surviving claims are recoverable from his estate
  • The impugned order dated 26 May 2010 (Impugned Order I) and the order dated 24 May 2018 (Impugned Order II) were set aside, and the revision petition was restored to its original number
  • The matter was remitted to the NCDRC to be adjudicated within six months from the date of the order

Key Legal Principles Established

1

The maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" (a personal action dies with the person) has been statutorily modified in India and does not apply with full rigour to extinguish claims on the death of a party.

2

Under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, all demands and rights to prosecute or defend an action survive to and against the legal representatives, except causes of action for defamation, assault, personal injuries not causing death, and cases where the relief would be nugatory.

3

Personal-injury claims (compensation for the patient's own pain and suffering) abate on the death of the doctor, but claims representing pecuniary loss to or accretion of the estate survive against the legal heirs.

4

The "right to sue / cause of action" in Order XXII Rules 2 and 4 of the CPC is a matter of substantive law located in Section 306 of the 1925 Act; the procedural CPC must be harmoniously construed with the substantive Succession Act.

5

Exceptions to the survival of claims under Section 306 must be construed strictly so they do not swallow the enabling rule that liabilities pass to the legal representative.

6

The legal representative of a deceased person represents only the estate of the deceased and cannot be saddled with personal rights that extinguished with the death of his predecessor.

7

On the death of a defendant, what matters is whether an enforceable decree existed as on the date of death and whether the surviving claim is chargeable to the estate — the nature of the claim and relief determines survival.

8

A consumer complaint of medical negligence does not stand wholly abated on the doctor's death; the forum must first decide negligence and then determine which surviving claims are recoverable from the estate.

Key Takeaways

What different people should know from this case

  • If a doctor accused of medical negligence dies while your consumer case is still pending, the case is not automatically over — you may still pursue claims chargeable to the doctor's estate.
  • Compensation purely for the patient's personal pain and suffering generally cannot be recovered after the doctor's death, but financial losses such as medical expenses and other pecuniary loss can survive against the heirs.
  • You must ask the consumer forum to substitute the deceased doctor's legal heirs (such as spouse and children) on record so the case can continue.
  • The heirs are only liable to the extent of the estate they inherited from the deceased — they do not pay out of their own separate property.
  • Even after the doctor's death, the forum must still decide whether the doctor was actually negligent before any money can be recovered from the estate.
  • Keep records of all medical expenses and financial losses, because these "loss to estate" claims are exactly the kind that survive the doctor's death.

Frequently Asked Questions

It concerned whether a medical negligence claim survives when the doctor accused of negligence dies while the consumer case is still pending. Dr. P.B. Lall, an eye surgeon, died during the pendency of a revision petition before the NCDRC. The Supreme Court held that his legal heirs could be impleaded, but only for claims chargeable to his estate — personal-injury claims abate, while pecuniary loss-to-estate claims survive.
No, not entirely. The Supreme Court held that the old common law maxim "a personal action dies with the person" has been statutorily modified in India by Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Purely personal claims (such as compensation for the patient's pain and suffering) abate on the doctor's death, but claims representing financial loss to the estate survive and can be recovered from the doctor's legal heirs to the extent of the estate.
It is a Latin common law maxim meaning "a personal right of action dies with the person." The Supreme Court held that this maxim no longer applies with full rigour in India because the legislature has modified it through the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, the Legal Representatives' Suits Act 1855, and Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The maxim now survives only for narrow exceptions such as defamation, assault, and personal injuries not causing death.
The legal heirs can be brought on record, but their liability is limited to the estate they inherited from the deceased doctor. They do not pay out of their own separate property. The consumer forum must first determine whether the doctor was negligent, and then decide which surviving claims (those chargeable to the estate) are recoverable.
A personal claim (for example, compensation for the patient's own pain, suffering, or loss of vision as a personal injury) is tied to the person and abates on the doctor's death. An estate claim (for example, quantifiable pecuniary loss such as medical expenses, loss of income, or other financial loss to the estate) represents compensatory civil liability and survives against the legal heirs. The recoverable amount depends entirely on this classification.
The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC's impugned orders, restored the revision petition to its original number, and remitted the matter to the NCDRC to be decided within six months. The NCDRC must first adjudicate whether the deceased doctor was negligent, and then determine which surviving claims are recoverable from his estate, rather than treating every claim on merits as recoverable from the estate.

DISCLAIMER: This case summary is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. For advice on your specific situation, please consult a qualified advocate. JurisOptima is not responsible for any actions taken based on this information.

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