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2026 INSC 234Supreme Court of India

Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police

Dismissal Without Departmental Inquiry Under Article 311(2)(b) Requires Objective Satisfaction, Not Mere Presumption

12 March 2026Justice J.K. Maheshwari, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
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TL;DR

The Supreme Court quashed the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable who was dismissed from service under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution without a regular departmental inquiry. The Court held that the disciplinary authority relied on mere presumption of witness intimidation without any objective material on record to support its satisfaction that holding an inquiry was not reasonably practicable. Since the constable was in custody when the dismissal order was passed, the claim that he could threaten or intimidate witnesses was baseless. The Court ordered reinstatement with continuity of service, 50% back wages, and all consequential benefits.

The Bottom Line

A government employee cannot be dismissed without a departmental inquiry merely on the basis of presumption or speculation that witnesses may be intimidated. The disciplinary authority must have objective, verifiable material to justify dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b). If the reasons recorded are found to be irrelevant or based on conjecture, courts will quash the dismissal and order reinstatement.

Case Timeline

The journey from FIR to Supreme Court verdict

event
27 Jun 2017

Alleged Robbery of Sandalwood

Constable Manohar Lal allegedly visited a godown in Bhalswa Dairy area, made enquiries about the goods, and later returned with accomplices to forcibly load approximately 1355 kg of sandalwood.

filing
28 Jun 2017

FIR No. 390/2017 Registered

FIR registered at PS Bhalswa Dairy under Sections 419/457/380/392/412/34 IPC based on the complaint of Maniram.

arrest
29 Jun 2017

Appellant Taken into Custody

Constable Manohar Lal was arrested and taken into custody in connection with FIR No. 390/2017.

order
18 Jul 2017

Dismissal Order by DCP

Deputy Commissioner of Police, Special Cell, New Delhi dismissed the appellant from service under Article 311(2)(b) without departmental inquiry, while the appellant was still in custody.

event
14 Oct 2017

Appellant Released on Bail

Constable Manohar Lal was released on bail, nearly three months after the dismissal order was passed.

order
30 Jul 2018

Appellate Authority Dismisses Appeal

Special Commissioner of Police dismissed the departmental appeal, accepting the reasons in the dismissal order.

order
29 Nov 2022

CAT Dismisses Application

Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi dismissed OA No. 744 of 2020 filed by the appellant.

order
2 Feb 2023

High Court Dismisses Writ Petition

Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1309 of 2023, accepting the reasoning of the DCP.

judgment
12 Mar 2026

Supreme Court Allows Appeal

Supreme Court quashed the dismissal order and all subsequent orders, directing reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% back wages.

The Story

Constable Manohar Lal (No. 362/Special Cell, PIS No. 28070974) was a police constable posted in the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. On 28.06.2017, FIR No. 390/2017 was registered against him under Sections 419/457/380/392/412/34 IPC at PS Bhalswa Dairy, alleging his involvement in a robbery of approximately 1355 kg of sandalwood from a godown. According to the complainant Maniram, the constable had visited the godown on 27.06.2017, made enquiries about the goods, and later returned with a tempo and car along with other accused persons to forcibly break open the room and load the sandalwood.

The appellant was taken into custody on 29.06.2017. While he was in custody, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP), Special Cell, New Delhi passed an order dated 18.07.2017 dismissing him from service under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, without conducting a regular departmental inquiry. The DCP relied on a preliminary inquiry report by the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), Shri Govind Sharma, who found that it would not be 'reasonably practicable' to conduct a regular departmental inquiry due to reasonable belief of threat, intimidation, and inducement to the victim and the possibility of tampering with vital evidence.

The appellant was released on bail on 14.10.2017. He challenged the dismissal before the appellate authority (Special Commissioner of Police), which dismissed his appeal on 30.07.2018. He then filed OA No. 744 of 2020 before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, which was dismissed on 29.11.2022. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1309 of 2023 filed before the Delhi High Court was also dismissed on 02.02.2023. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues

Click each question to reveal the Supreme Court's answer

1Question

Whether the disciplinary authority's satisfaction that holding a departmental inquiry was not "reasonably practicable" under Article 311(2)(b) was based on objective material or mere presumption?

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1SC Answer

The Court held it was based on mere presumption. The preliminary inquiry report of the ACP did not contain any instance of the complainant or witnesses being actually threatened, intimidated, or traumatised. The ACP's conclusion about the possibility of witness intimidation was speculative. The Court noted that the appellant was in custody when the dismissal order was passed, making the claim of witness intimidation even more baseless.

Establishes that the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority under Article 311(2)(b) must be objective, based on verifiable material, and not a mere presumption or speculation. Recording reasons in writing is insufficient if those reasons are not grounded in actual material.

2Question

What is the scope of judicial review of orders passed under Article 311(2)(b) dispensing with a departmental inquiry?

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2SC Answer

The Court held that despite Article 311(3) making the decision of the disciplinary authority final, the scope of judicial review remains open under Articles 226 and 32. Courts will examine whether clause (b) was properly applied, whether the reasons are germane, whether there is mala fides, and whether a reasonable person would have reached the same conclusion. The Court will not sit as an appellate authority but will assess the relevancy of the reasons from the perspective of a reasonable person in the disciplinary authority's position.

Reaffirms that Article 311(3) does not create an absolute bar to judicial review. Courts retain the power to strike down orders dispensing with inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or based on mala fides.

3Question

Whether dismissal is a major penalty requiring a regular departmental inquiry under the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and the 1980 Rules?

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3SC Answer

Yes. Under Rule 6 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980, dismissal is classified as a major penalty (Serial No. (i) under Rule 5) that can only be awarded after a regular departmental inquiry by a competent authority not below the rank of the appointing authority. Dispensing with this procedure is permissible only under the exceptions in Article 311(2).

Clarifies that the Delhi Police Act and Rules mandate a regular departmental inquiry before imposing major penalties like dismissal, and bypassing this procedure requires strict compliance with Article 311(2) provisos.

Arguments

The battle of arguments before the Supreme Court

Petitioner

Vihaan Kumar

1

Dismissal without inquiry violates Article 311(2) protections

The appellant contended that under Section 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and Rules 5, 6, and 14 of the 1980 Rules, dismissal is a major penalty that can only be awarded after a regular departmental inquiry. The DCP bypassed the mandatory procedure without valid justification.

Section 21, Delhi Police Act, 1978Rule 6, Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980
2

Reasons for dispensing with inquiry are flimsy and presumptive

The appellant argued that the reason assigned -- possibility of witness intimidation -- was flimsy since the appellant was in custody from 29.06.2017 when the dismissal order was passed on 18.07.2017. There was no material to show any actual threat, intimidation, or inducement to any witness.

3

Article 311(2)(b) exception not properly invoked

Relying on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, the appellant contended that the disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with inquiry lightly or arbitrarily, and the ACP's preliminary inquiry report contained no material justifying the conclusion that holding an inquiry was not reasonably practicable.

Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 362Ex. Const. Chhote Lal v. Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 196Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (2005) 11 SCC 525Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 581State of Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh (2007) 15 SCC 217Reena Rani v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 215Risal Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 244
4

High Court and CAT failed to properly scrutinize the dismissal order

The appellant urged that the CAT and High Court committed grave error by refusing to examine whether clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) was properly applied, merely accepting the DCP's reasoning without independent analysis.

Respondent

State of Haryana

1

Preliminary inquiry report justifies dispensing with departmental inquiry

The State, represented by ASG Mr. Brijender Chahar, relied on the preliminary inquiry report of the ACP and contended that the complainant and witnesses had been traumatised by the egregious act of the appellant and his associates in the police department.

2

Risk of witness intimidation due to association with criminals

The respondents argued that the appellant had close association with hard-core criminals and there was every possibility that he could approach the complainant or witnesses through his associates to threaten, intimidate, or induce them to withdraw from the case or turn hostile during trial.

3

Stand accepted by all lower fora

The respondents contended that the stand taken by the Department had been accepted by the appellate authority, the CAT, and the High Court, and therefore interference by the Supreme Court was not warranted.

Court's Analysis

How the Court reasoned its decision

The Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of the scope and application of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2), drawing extensively from the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel. The Court examined the preliminary inquiry report that formed the basis of the DCP's satisfaction and found it critically deficient. While the ACP's report collected documents and recorded statements of the complainant, the investigating officer, and other witnesses, none of these statements contained any instance of the complainant or witnesses being actually threatened, intimidated, or traumatised. The ACP's conclusion about possible intimidation was merely a presumption without supporting material. The Court also noted a crucial factual circumstance: the dismissal order was passed on 18.07.2017 while the appellant was in custody since 29.06.2017, making the apprehension of witness intimidation from custody wholly unjustified without specific evidence. The Court found that the disciplinary authority proceeded on the basis of the ACP's presumption without any material and directed dismissal without application of mind, which was arbitrary. The High Court's reliance on paragraph 101 of Tulsiram Patel without considering the crucial subsequent paragraphs 130, 133, and 138 was held to be completely misplaced.

No instance of traumatising the complainant or witnesses have been stated by any witness in their statements. Whether the act as alleged in the FIR is egregious in nature, would be a subject matter of trial. No material showing connection of the appellant and his associates with criminals which may reasonably demonstrate that there is a possibility of the complainant or witnesses being approached through his associates with an intent to threaten, intimidate or induce them to withdraw from the case or turn hostile is on record.

Para 28

The Court found that the entire basis for dispensing with the inquiry -- witness intimidation -- was unsupported by any material evidence in the preliminary inquiry report.

The disciplinary authority proceeded on the presumption of the ACP who conducted preliminary enquiry without any material and concluded that holding a regular enquiry is not reasonably practicable. Analysing the purport of the proviso and the interpretation made in the judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) it was the duty of the disciplinary authority to satisfy himself that such reasoning as indicated in the preliminary enquiry report is based on some material, sufficient to dispense with an enquiry.

Para 31

Establishes that the disciplinary authority has an independent duty to verify that the reasons for dispensing with an inquiry are based on actual material, not just accept the presumption of the preliminary inquiry officer.

The appellant was taken into custody on 29.06.2017 and he was only be released on bail on 14.10.2017. In such a situation it is clear that while he was in custody the order of dismissal was passed. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the ACP holding the preliminary enquiry to indicate any instances of threat from custody to the complainant or to intimidate witnesses brought during investigation.

Para 31

The fact that the appellant was in jail when the dismissal order was passed fundamentally undermined the claim that he could intimidate witnesses, exposing the arbitrariness of the decision.

The satisfaction as recorded must be the objective satisfaction on the basis of material brought on record which ordinarily the disciplinary authority may take as a prudent person. Otherwise, dispensing with the enquiry is not permissible in law.

Para 41

Sets the standard for the quality of satisfaction required under Article 311(2)(b) -- it must be objective, material-based, and one that a prudent person would reach.

In light of the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion is to set aside the order passed by the CAT and the High Court and to quash the order of dismissal passed by the DCP and confirmed by the appellate authority. In consequence, the appellant shall forthwith be reinstated with continuity of service.

Para 42

The Court not only quashed the dismissal but ordered full reinstatement with continuity of service, demonstrating the serious consequences of arbitrary invocation of Article 311(2)(b).

Allowed

The Verdict

Relief Granted

The appellant was ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service and entitled to all consequential benefits notionally. Back wages were restricted to 50% considering the pending criminal case. The respondent retains the right to initiate a proper departmental inquiry in accordance with law.

Directions Issued

  • Order of dismissal passed by the DCP dated 18.07.2017 and the order of the appellate authority dated 30.07.2018 are quashed
  • Orders of the CAT dated 29.11.2022 and the High Court dated 02.02.2023 affirming the dismissal are set aside
  • Appellant shall forthwith be reinstated with continuity of service
  • Appellant entitled to all consequential benefits notionally
  • Back wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement restricted to 50% since criminal case is pending
  • Reinstatement is without prejudice to the respondent's right to initiate a departmental enquiry in accordance with law
  • Parties to bear their own costs

Key Legal Principles Established

1

The satisfaction of the disciplinary authority under Article 311(2)(b) must be objective and based on verifiable material, not on mere presumption or speculation.

2

A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a departmental inquiry lightly, arbitrarily, or out of ulterior motives, or merely to avoid holding an inquiry or because the department's case is weak.

3

The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the courts, and the scope of judicial review is open to examine whether clause (b) was properly applied.

4

Dismissal is a major penalty under the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 that can only be imposed after a regular departmental inquiry, except where a valid exception under Article 311(2) applies.

5

When examining the applicability of clause (b), courts will place themselves in the position of the disciplinary authority and consider whether a reasonable person in the prevailing situation would have reached the same conclusion.

6

If the reasons recorded for dispensing with the inquiry are found to be irrelevant, the recording of satisfaction would be an abuse of power and the penalty order would stand invalidated.

7

The Commissioner of Police's own departmental circular (dated 31.12.1998) recognises that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a shortcut and requires cogent, legally tenable reasons recorded at length before dispensing with inquiry.

Key Takeaways

What different people should know from this case

  • A government employee cannot be dismissed from service without being given a proper hearing and inquiry, except in very limited circumstances specified in the Constitution.
  • If you are a government servant and have been dismissed without a departmental inquiry, you have the right to challenge the dismissal in court even if the order claims it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.
  • The fact that a criminal case is registered against you does not automatically justify dismissal without inquiry. The disciplinary authority must show specific, concrete reasons why an inquiry cannot be held.
  • Even if you are in custody, the authorities cannot claim you might intimidate witnesses without actual evidence of such intimidation. Being in jail actually weakens the case for dispensing with an inquiry.
  • If your dismissal order is quashed by the Supreme Court, you are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages, though the department may still initiate a proper departmental inquiry later.

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Frequently Asked Questions

This case involves the Supreme Court quashing the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable who was dismissed from service without a departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. The Court found that the disciplinary authority relied on mere presumption of witness intimidation without any actual evidence, and that the constable was in custody when the dismissal order was passed, making the claim of intimidation baseless.
Generally, no. Article 311(2) of the Constitution provides that a civil servant shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry with charges and a reasonable opportunity of hearing. However, the second proviso provides three exceptions: (a) conviction on a criminal charge, (b) where the authority records in writing that holding an inquiry is not reasonably practicable, and (c) where the President or Governor considers it inexpedient for security of state. Even under these exceptions, the reasons must be genuine and based on objective material.
As explained by the Constitution Bench in Tulsiram Patel, the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not "impracticable." It does not require total or absolute impracticability. What is required is that holding the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. However, this must be based on objective material, not mere presumption.
Yes. Despite Article 311(3) making the decision of the disciplinary authority "final," the Supreme Court has consistently held that the scope of judicial review under Articles 226 and 32 remains open. Courts can examine whether the reasons are germane, relevant, and based on material, and whether a reasonable person would have reached the same conclusion. The finality clause does not bar judicial scrutiny of arbitrary or mala fide decisions.
The employee is entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and consequential benefits. In this case, the Supreme Court restricted back wages to 50% because a criminal case was pending against the constable. The reinstatement does not prevent the department from initiating a proper departmental inquiry in accordance with law.
The Commissioner of Police issued a circular dated 31.12.1998 (and clarificatory circular dated 11.09.2007) acknowledging widespread misuse of Article 311(2)(b). The circular noted that in most cases where the power was invoked, the CAT and High Court struck down the orders. It directed that before invoking this power, the disciplinary authority must personally be satisfied based on material on file, record cogent and legally tenable reasons at length, conduct a preliminary enquiry first, and obtain prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.

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