JurisOptima
Cases/2026 INSC 648
Remanded
2026 INSC 648 • Supreme Court of India

Rajat Kumar v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya

“No Compensation Forced on a Plaintiff Who Never Asked for It: Supreme Court Restores Encroachment Decrees and Sends Second Appeals Back to the High Court”

19 June 2026Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Download PDF

TL;DR

The Supreme Court set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had overturned two decrees for removal of encroachment (a wall on common open space and a lintel of a school building placed on the plaintiff's house wall) and, instead, directed the Executing Court to have the construction valued so that the plaintiff's legal heirs could be paid money. The Court held that the plaintiff had never prayed for damages or compensation, the legal heirs had not consented to it, and once the decrees were set aside there was no decree left for the Executing Court to execute. The High Court had also proceeded on a factually wrong premise (that the Trial Court found the wall to be common) and had not framed or answered any substantial question of law. The Court set aside the High Court's common judgment dated 02.05.2016 in RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008, requested the High Court to re-decide both Second Appeals on merits under Section 100 CPC, and asked that it do so expeditiously.

The Bottom Line

A court cannot take away a decree for removal of encroachment and force the winning party to accept money for which no one ever asked. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had no basis to substitute a valuation-and-payment arrangement for the injunction decrees, because there was no prayer for compensation, no consent from the plaintiff's legal heirs, and no decree left to execute. The two Second Appeals go back to the High Court to be decided properly under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Case Timeline

The journey from FIR to Supreme Court verdict

judgment
8 Nov 2004

Trial Court Decrees Lintel Removal Suit

In Civil Suit No. 148 of 2000, the Trial Court directed the defendants to remove the lintel of the school building from the plaintiff's wall and restrained them from placing any lintel on any wall of his house.

judgment
6 Feb 2006

Trial Court Decrees Encroachment Suit

In Civil Suit No. 426 of 1996, the Trial Court directed the defendants to remove the encroachment committed by raising walls on the common open space and restrained further construction over the walls.

order
5 Sept 2007

First Appeals Dismissed

Regular Civil Appeal No. 137 of 2006 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 143 of 2004 were dismissed, upholding the Trial Court decrees.

judgment
25 Nov 2011

High Court Substitutes Payment for Removal

In the Second Appeals, the High Court directed payment of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 7,000/- (half the construction cost) with 12% interest and treated the walls as common on such payment.

order
13 Sept 2013

Supreme Court Remands Earlier Round

In Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 and 8281 of 2013, the Supreme Court held that modifying the decrees without entering into the merits and without framing substantial questions of law was impermissible, and remanded the Second Appeals.

judgment
2 May 2016

High Court Orders Valuation by Executing Court

On remand, the High Court set aside the decrees and directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the construction so that the defendants could deposit the amount for the plaintiff's legal heirs (common judgment in RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008).

judgment
19 Jun 2026

Supreme Court Sets Aside High Court Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's common judgment dated 02.05.2016 and requested the High Court to reconsider both Second Appeals on merits under Section 100 CPC, expeditiously.

The Story

The original plaintiff, Om Parkash, filed Civil Suit No. 426 of 1996 against S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Sadhaura and others, seeking a mandatory injunction for removal of an alleged illegal encroachment in the form of a wall constructed by them on the common open space beyond his house, and a permanent injunction restraining further construction. According to him, the construction interfered with his enjoyment of air and light through ventilators and obstructed the passage of water through the common path. The Trial Court decreed the suit on 06.02.2006, directing removal of the encroachment and restraining further construction over the walls. Regular Civil Appeal No. 137 of 2006 preferred by the defendants was dismissed on 05.09.2007.

The plaintiff also filed Civil Suit No. 148 of 2000 against the same defendants for a mandatory injunction for removal of the lintel of the school building that the defendants had placed on the wall of his house. The Trial Court decreed that suit on 08.11.2004, directing removal of the lintel and restraining the defendants from putting any lintel on any wall of the plaintiff's house. Regular Civil Appeal No. 143 of 2004 was dismissed by the first Appellate Court on 05.09.2007.

The defendants filed Regular Second Appeals No. 364 of 2008 and No. 363 of 2008 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By judgment dated 25.11.2011 the High Court, instead of dismissing the appeals, directed the defendants to pay Rs. 10,000/- (in the first matter) and Rs. 7,000/- (in the second), being half the cost of construction, with interest at 12% per annum, and treated the walls as common between the parties on payment. By order dated 13.09.2013 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 and 8281 of 2013, the Supreme Court held that modifying the decrees without entering into the merits was impermissible, noted that no substantial questions of law had been framed, set aside those judgments and remanded the matter.

On remand, the High Court noted that the wall had been built long back, that there was no valuation report on record and that the plaintiff's claim had not been proved. Reasoning that the other party could be compensated in money, it directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the construction and the defendants to deposit that amount for payment to the plaintiff's legal heirs, and set aside the decrees of the Trial Court as affirmed by the first Appellate Court. The legal heirs of the plaintiff challenged this in the present appeals. The respondents did not appear despite service after 23.04.2019, and the Court heard counsel for the appellants and perused the record.

Legal Issues

Click each question to reveal the Supreme Court's answer

1Question

Whether the High Court could set aside concurrent decrees for removal of encroachment and instead compel the plaintiff's legal heirs to accept monetary compensation assessed by a valuer, when no prayer for damages or compensation had been made in the suits?

Tap to reveal answer
1SC Answer

No. The Court held that there was no prayer whatsoever for damages or compensation, and the legal heirs had not consented to such a course. The High Court therefore could not compensate one party at the cost of the other without any prayer being made in that regard.

Reinforces that relief must be tied to the pleadings and prayers: a court cannot substitute a different remedy for a decree that the successful party never agreed to give up.

2Question

Whether the Executing Court could be directed to assess the value of the wall after the decrees under execution had themselves been set aside?

Tap to reveal answer
2SC Answer

No. Once the decrees passed by the Trial Court were set aside, there would be no decree holding the field for being executed, so the Executing Court would be undertaking an exercise not supported by any decree. The Court also observed that the course adopted does not find support under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Clarifies that execution proceedings are derivative of a subsisting decree; a court cannot assign valuation work to an Executing Court in the absence of one.

3Question

Whether the High Court, deciding Second Appeals, followed the requirements of Section 100 CPC and the earlier remand order of the Supreme Court?

Tap to reveal answer
3SC Answer

No. The High Court referred to three questions urged as substantial questions of law but did not indicate that they were treated as such, yet concluded that the substantial questions were answered in favour of the defendants. It also repeated the same kind of compensation exercise that the Supreme Court had earlier set aside, and proceeded on a wrong premise that the Trial Court had found the wall to be common.

Underscores that Second Appeals must be decided on identified substantial questions of law and that a remand order must be genuinely followed by the High Court.

Arguments

The battle of arguments before the Supreme Court

Petitioner

Vihaan Kumar

1

No prayer for compensation was ever made

The appellants, legal heirs of the original plaintiff, contended through counsel that the suits were essentially for mandatory injunctions seeking removal of encroachment and removal of a lintel, and that the original plaintiff never sought damages or compensation. They said the High Court could not decree monetary relief that was never claimed and that they had not agreed to.

2

Decrees could not be set aside and then executed through valuation

The High Court set aside the decrees but still directed the Executing Court to value the wall; the appellants pointed out that with no decree remaining, there was nothing for the Executing Court to execute. This course, they submitted, lacked support under Order XXI CPC.

Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
3

The High Court repeated an error already set aside by this Court

The appellants highlighted that the earlier compensation-based disposal in 2011 had been set aside by the Supreme Court on 13.09.2013, and that on remand the High Court again adopted a monetary solution, this time through valuation, without framing substantial questions of law and on a mistaken premise about the Trial Court's findings.

Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 and 8281 of 2013 (order dated 13.09.2013)Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Respondent

State of Haryana

1

High Court's view: long-standing construction, compensation sufficient

The respondents did not appear before the Supreme Court after 23.04.2019. The position reflected in the High Court's impugned judgment, as recorded by the Supreme Court, was that the wall had been constructed long back, there was no valuation report on record, the plaintiff's claim had not been proved, and the plaintiff could be compensated in money assessed by a valuer so as to do justice between the parties.

Court's Analysis

How the Court reasoned its decision

The Supreme Court examined why the High Court's approach could not stand. First, it looked at what the suits actually claimed: mandatory injunctions for removal of a wall on common open space and of a school lintel placed on the plaintiff's wall, supported by findings that the defendants had no right, title or interest in the land on which the wall was erected and had illegally placed the lintel. Both decrees had been affirmed by the first Appellate Court. Because the plaintiff never sought damages or compensation, the High Court could not override the decrees by obliging his legal heirs to take valuation-based money they had not consented to. Second, the Court addressed procedure: after setting aside the decrees the High Court still directed the Executing Court to value the wall, but with no decree in existence there was nothing to execute, and the course had no support under Order XXI CPC. Third, the Court observed that the High Court had already once attempted a similar compensation solution which this Court had set aside, yet repeated it on remand. Finally, it identified two defects in the High Court's reasoning: a factually wrong premise (that the Trial Court had found the wall common, when it had in fact decreed removal) and the absence of any substantial question of law actually framed under Section 100, despite concluding that such questions were answered in the defendants' favour. These defects, in the Court's words, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Since the Second Appeals had never been adjudicated on merits, the Court remitted them to the High Court.

There was no prayer whatsoever made by the original plaintiff seeking any damages or compensation from the defendants for the encroachment committed by them.

Para 5(a)

The foundation of the ruling: relief granted must correspond to what was sought, and the High Court had no pleaded basis to order monetary compensation.

The legal heirs of the plaintiff did not consent for such course to be followed.

Para 5(a)

Lack of consent from the decree-holders removed any possible justification for converting an injunction decree into a payment arrangement.

Once the decrees passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff were set aside, there would be no occasion for the Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings since there would be no decree holding the field for being executed.

Para 5(b)

Explains the internal contradiction in the High Court's order: valuation by an Executing Court presupposes a subsisting decree.

The legal heirs of the plaintiff have been required to accept monetary relief for which a prayer was never made. Such course has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

Para 5(d)

States the Court's conclusion on the effect of the High Court's approach on the plaintiff's legal heirs.

Remanded

The Verdict

Relief Granted

The valuation-and-payment directions given by the High Court no longer operate, and the matters stand restored to the High Court for decision on merits. The Court did not itself decide the merits of the encroachment dispute, as the Second Appeals had not been adjudicated on merits.

Directions Issued

  • The High Court's common judgment dated 02.05.2016 in RSA No. 363 of 2008 and RSA No. 364 of 2008 is set aside
  • The High Court is requested to re-consider both Second Appeals in accordance with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and decide them on their own merits
  • Considering that the Second Appeals date from 2008, the High Court is requested to consider them expeditiously
  • No order as to costs

Key Legal Principles Established

1

A court cannot grant a relief which the plaintiff never prayed for, and cannot compel a successful plaintiff to accept monetary compensation in place of an injunction decree without his consent.

2

Execution proceedings depend on a subsisting decree; if the decree is set aside, the Executing Court has nothing to execute and cannot be directed to carry out a valuation exercise.

3

In Second Appeals, the High Court must deal with substantial questions of law in accordance with Section 100 CPC, and cannot set aside concurrent decrees without a question of law actually available for consideration.

4

A High Court is bound to follow the spirit of a remand order and should not repeat the same course that the Supreme Court has earlier set aside.

5

A High Court order proceeding on a factually incorrect premise about the findings of the Trial Court cannot be sustained.

Key Takeaways

What different people should know from this case

  • If you win a suit for removal of an encroachment, a higher court cannot simply convert your decree into a money payment unless you asked for compensation or agreed to it.
  • Decrees that have been upheld in a first appeal are not easily undone in a Second Appeal; the High Court must identify a real question of law first.
  • Keep your prayers in the plaint clear: courts decide a case based on the relief actually sought.
  • When the Supreme Court sends a matter back to the High Court, the High Court must decide it properly; here both appeals, pending since 2008, were returned for an expeditious decision.
  • A person who obtains a decree for removal of a wall or other construction on common space can insist that the decree be decided on the legal merits rather than replaced by a valuation.

Frequently Asked Questions

The Supreme Court set aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court's common judgment dated 02.05.2016 in RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008. The High Court had overturned decrees for removal of a wall and a lintel and directed the Executing Court to value the construction so that the plaintiff's legal heirs could be compensated in money. The Supreme Court held this was impermissible and sent both Second Appeals back to the High Court for fresh decision on merits.
Because the original plaintiff had never prayed for damages or compensation, and his legal heirs did not consent to taking money. The Supreme Court held that the High Court could not compensate one party at the cost of the other without any prayer being made in that regard.
The High Court had set aside the decrees but still asked the Executing Court to proceed. The Supreme Court explained that once the decrees were set aside, no decree remained to be executed, so the Executing Court would be performing an exercise unsupported by any decree. The Court added that this course lacks support under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
No. The Court noted that the Second Appeals had not been adjudicated on merits and therefore requested the High Court to reconsider them under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and decide them on merits. It asked the High Court to do so expeditiously, since the appeals date from 2008.
The Supreme Court found that the High Court proceeded on the premise that the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 426 of 1996 had recorded a finding that the wall was a common wall. No such finding was recorded; the Trial Court had decreed removal of the wall.

DISCLAIMER: This case summary is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. For advice on your specific situation, please consult a qualified advocate. JurisOptima is not responsible for any actions taken based on this information.

Facing aSimilar Situation?

Our advocates can help you understand how this judgment applies to your case.